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1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider a model of Bertrand price competition for a single buyer
among many sellers in a dynamic environment. We analyze the existence and effi-
ciency of equilibria in models where the stage game payoffs to the buyer as well as
the sellers may depend on the history of past purchases. Examples of dependence of
this type include learning by doing for the sellers and habit formation for the buyer.
Bertrand price competition provides an attractive modeling approach for markets
with differentiated commodities as it places the bargaining power in the hands of the
players on the long side of the market. This results in a nontrivial sharing of the
surplus arising from trades between the buyer and the sellers. If the buyer has unit
demand, the equilibrium in the static game is efficient, and the sharing of economic
surplus can be studied independently of any economic distortions. We extend the
static model to a general dynamic environment. Issues such as surplus sharing and
efficiency then require more careful analysis. If current choices have an impact on
future surpluses, the intertemporal aspects of surplus sharing gain in importance.
Consider for example an industry where an entrant has a technology that will achieve
lower costs of production than the incumbent’s technology, but whose initial costs are
quite high. It may well be that the seller must sell at prices below costs in the initial
periods in the expectation of the future profits. The ultimate success of the entrant
depends on the degree to which the costs and benefits of the initial periods can be
shared between the participants in the market.
In the model of this paper, a finite number of sellers offer differentiated products to
a single buyer with unit demand over a discrete time horizon of either finite or infinite
length. At the beginning of each period, the sellers choose simultaneously prices for
their products and the buyer chooses the seller to supply the product (or possibly she
chooses not to buy in that period). Because of assuming unit demands, we have also
the alternative interpretation of the model as one where a number of firms compete
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in spot wage contracts for a given worker over time.1 All the players discount future
with the same discount factor δ. In order to allow for dynamic elements in the model,
we allow the surplus from each trade to depend on the sequence of trades made in the
previous periods. In the job matching model, such dynamic features arise naturally
from learning on the job and participation in training programs. Hence the scope of
the model is much larger than in a simple repetition of static price competition across
periods.
The finite horizon model is analyzed first. By a simple example, we show that the
existence of a pure strategy equilibrium cannot be taken for granted. If the surplus
resulting from a purchase from seller i depends on the history of sales by sellers other
than i, the model has a direct intertemporal externality. Hence there is really no
reason to expect that a model with (spot) prices as the only feasible transfers would
be well behaved with respect to the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation. The
restrictive element in price competition is that seller i can offer (positive or negative)
transfers to the buyer only in conjunction with a purchase of the product of seller i.
Yet with externalities, it is conceivable that seller i would sometimes like to induce the
buyer to purchase from j and would be willing to support the purchase of product
j with a subsidy. To rule out this class of problems, we assume that the surplus
generated by the purchase of a given seller’s product depends only on the number
of past purchases from that seller. This is consistent with the examples of habit
formation and learning by doing and it also accommodates job specific learning in
the job matching model. Surprisingly, the equilibria in this case may be inefficient as
well and there may be a multiplicity of them.
In contrast, the results that we obtain in the stationary infinite horizon version
of the model are much more in line with the static model. In particular, the model
always has an efficient equilibrium and the payoffs are uniquely determined in a large
1Models of this type include Jovanovic (1979) and Miller (1984) in a competitive market and
Felli & Harris (1996) in a duopsonistic labor market.
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class of games. We show that in the efficient equilibrium, the payoff to each seller
coincides with her marginal contribution to the social surplus in the model.
The equilibrium in the infinite horizon model is derived by using the well known
“guess and verify” method from dynamic programming. But in stark contrast to the
received use of this method, our guess does not rely on any functional or paramet-
ric specification of the value function. The novelty in our argument is that the value
function of each seller is the guessed to be the difference of two general value functions
generated by different socially optimal programs. The equilibrium is then established
by demonstrating that the constituting social programs have certain structural prop-
erties. This allows us to analyze the value functions of the sellers as if they were
the result of single agent optimization problems rather than multi-agent strategic
interactions.
In order to keep the arguments as simple as possible,we consider only deterministic
models. The techniques we use extend, however, to the stochastic case. Hence e.g.
models of learning about match quality can be analyzed with the tools developed
in this paper. We defer a fuller discussion of how the argument is extended to the
conclusion.
This paper is related to two of our earlier papers. In Bergemann & Va¨lima¨ki
(1996), we analyzed an infinite horizon model of dynamic price competition with two
sellers and uncertainty. Felli & Harris (1996) considered a similar model, yet set in
labour market environment as a job matching model, in which two buyers (the em-
ployers) compete for a single seller (the employee) in an infinite horizon continuous
time model with Brownian motion. In the current paper, we identify directions in
which the results of these two papers extend (the number of sellers), and also dimen-
sions along which the results cannot be pushed any further (finite horizon models).
In Bergemann & Va¨lima¨ki (2003), we analyze a similar dynamic environment but
there the sellers compete in a menu auction rather than in prices. Formally, that
model is a dynamic version of the common agency model first analyzed in Bernheim
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& Whinston (1986). In a menu auction the sellers are allowed to offer transfers
contingent on the purchase decision of the buyer. Thus seller i is allowed to offer a
transfer to the buyer in a particular period even in the event that the buyer purchases
from seller j in that period. Each seller can therefore cross subsidize the buyer for
her purchases with other sellers. This rich set of transfers allows us to establish the
efficiency of the dynamic allocation in the presence of intertemporal externalities.
As such transfers and subsidies are rarely observed in actual economic situations, we
investigate in the current paper when simple spot prices are sufficient for guaranteeing
the efficient allocation in the dynamic model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, defines the
Markov Perfect equilibrium and introduces the notion of marginal contribution. Sec-
tion 3 analyzes the finite horizon model. Section 4 considers the infinite horizon case.
It provides sufficient conditions for the existence
of an efficient equilibrium in terms of properties of the marginal contributions.
Section 5 considers an example and establishes that the marginal contributions satisfy
the desired properties. Section 6 shows that in a wide class of environments, the
marginal contribution equilibrium is the unique Markov Perfect equilibrium. Section
7 concludes and suggests further questions for research.
2 The Model
We consider the following stage game model of price competition for a buyer with
a unit demand. There are I sellers in the market, and we denote the set of sellers
by I = {1, ..., I} . Denote the surplus generated in the purchase of seller i′s product
by xi. The sellers set simultaneously prices pi for their products. At the end of the
stage game, the buyer chooses either one of the sellers or does not purchase at all.
We denote the buyers choice by a ∈ {0, 1, ..., I} , where a = 0 is interpreted as no
purchase and a = i denotes a purchase from seller i. The stage game payoffs for the
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sellers are given by
pii (p1, ..., pI , a) = pi if a = i,
pii (p1, ..., pI , a) = 0 if a 6= i.
The buyer’s stage game payoff is given by
ui (p1, ..., pI , a) = xi − pi if a = i.
By setting x0 = p0 = 0, we incorporate the payoffs from the case of no purchases as
well.
This (extensive form) stage game is repeated in a discrete time model with t =
0, 1, ..., T. We analyze separately the cases where T < ∞ and T = ∞. All of the
players discount future at discount factor δ ≤ 1. In the infinite horizon model,
we will assume that δ < 1 and that the payoff criterion is the discounted sum of
payoffs. At stage t, the actions in all previous periods are observable to all players.
A history in the game is a sequence of prices and decisions. More formally, we define
histories inductively by letting h0 = ∅ and ht = ht−1∪{pt−10 , pt−11 , ...pt−1I , at−1} , where{
pt−10 , p
t−1
1 , ...p
t−1
I , a
t−1} are the actions chosen in period t− 1. Let H t denote the set
of all possible histories in period t and H = ∪∞t=0H t.
We are interested in a dynamic version of the stage game. Hence we allow the
stage game surpluses xi to depend on h
t. At the same time, we do not want to make
the surpluses dependent on past pricing decisions by the sellers. As we also want to
avoid calendar time having a direct effect on the surpluses, we are led to consider the
vector
θ (h) , (t0 (h) , ..., tI (h)) ,
where ti (h) counts the number of times that alternative i was chosen by the buyer
along history h, as the relevant state variable summarizing the history. Notice that
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with this choice for a state variable, we ignore the importance of the order in which
the sellers made their sales. Thus we assume that
xi (h) = xi (θ (h)) for all i ∈ {0, ..., I} and h ∈ H.
In fact, in most of this paper we make the stronger assumption that the payoffs from
a given seller depend only on the past purchases with that seller.
Definition 1 (Independent Rewards)
The payoffs display independent rewards if for all i and θ: xi (θ (h)) = xi (ti (h)) .
From now on, we define a dynamic price competition game Γ to be a collection of
functions {x0 (θ) , x1 (θ) , ..., xI (θ) ;T} for all θ such that Σiti (θ) ≤ T .
A pure behavior strategy for seller i is a sequence of functions pi = {pti}∞t=0 , where
pti : H
t → R.
The buyer’s pure behavior strategy is similarly a sequence a = {at}∞t=0 , where
at : RI ×H t → {0, 1, ..., I} .
We are interested in the impact of the payoff relevant history on future play. In
other words, we want to consider only Markov perfect equilibria of the game, as
defined by Maskin & Tirole (forthcoming). In order to get a precise definition for the
payoff relevant state variable, we have to define a set of equivalence classes on the
set all possible states Θ. Fix the dynamic price competition game Γ. Each possible
θ induces a continuation price competition game Γ (θ) in the standard fashion. We
partition Θ into a (possibly infinite) family of subsets {Θk}Hk=1 by the requirement
that
Γ (θ) = Γ (θ′) ⇔ θ, θ′ ∈ Θk for some k.
In the generic case, a purchase from seller i leads to a payoff relevant state that is
different from that following a purchase from seller j 6= i. The collection {Θk}Hk=1 forms
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then the payoff relevant set of states for the dynamic price competition game. We say
that a strategy for seller i is Markovian if for all h and h′ such that θ (h) , θ (h′) ∈ Θk
for some k, we have pi (h) = pi (h
′) . The buyer’s strategy is Markovian if for all h and
h′ such that θ (h) , θ (h′) ∈ Θk for some k, and for all p, we have a (h, p) = a (h′, p) .
Definition 2 (Markov Perfect Equilibrium)
A collection (p1, ...,pI , a) is a Markov perfect equilibrium if
1. for all i, pi is a best response to (p−i, a) after all histories and a is a best
response to (p1, ...,pI) after all histories;
2. all players use Markovian strategies.
In much of what follows, we will concentrate on a refinement of the Markov perfect
equilibrium called a cautious equilibrium. For an arbitrary history h we write the
continuation payoffs to the buyer and seller i respectively as VB (h) and Vi (h) .
Definition 3 (Cautious Equilibrium)
A Markov perfect equilibrium is a cautious equilibrium if for a (θ, p1, ..., pI) ∈ {0, 1, ..., I} ,
and all i 6= a (θ, p1, ..., pI) ,
δVi (θ, a (θ, p1, ..., pI)) = pi (θ) + δVi (θ, i) ,
where a (θ, p1, ..., pI) denotes the equilibrium choice rule of the buyer and (θ, j) denotes
the state vector after state τ followed by the choice of alternative j ∈ {0, 1, ..., I} .
The basic idea behind this definition is that no seller should be willing to offer
prices that make the seller worse off relative to the equilibrium if accepted. In the
static version of this price competition model, cautious equilibrium is equivalent to
equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies. 2
2The same equilibrium notion has been used in the equilibrium analysis of Bergemann & Va¨lima¨ki
(1996) and Felli & Harris (1996).
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In the equilibrium analysis, we shall make repeated use of arguments based on
the social efficiency of paths along the game. We therefore conclude this section by
defining socially optimal payoffs for different versions of the game. These concepts will
be used repeatedly in the sections that follow. We introduce the indicator function
1{at=i} to describe the realized payoffs as a function of the choice behavior in period t.
More precisely, let 1{at=i} = 1 if at = i and 1{at=i} = 0 otherwise. The total surplus
along path {at} is given by
T∑
t=0
δt
(
I∑
i=1
xi (θ (h))1{at=i}
)
.
The social surplus is split between the buyer and the sellers. The intertemporal payoff
to the buyer from a sequence of choices {at} is simply
T∑
t=0
δt
(
I∑
i=1
(xi (θ (h))− pi (θ (h)))1{at=i}
)
,
and the intertemporal payoff to seller i is given by
T∑
t=0
δt
(
pi (θ (h))1{at=i}
)
.
Because of the quasi-linear payoff specification, Pareto efficiency coincides with
total surplus maximization in the game. Therefore we let
W (θ0) , max{at}∈IT
T∑
t=0
δt
(
I∑
i=1
xi (θ (h))1{at=i}
)
,
denote the social value of the game in period 0 at state θ0. We can similarly define
the continuation values W (θ) from an arbitrary state vector θ onwards. We will also
make use of social values to the game where some sellers have been excluded. We let
W−S , max
{at}∈(I\S)T
T∑
t=0
δt
 ∑
i∈(I\S)
xi (θ (h))1{at=i}

denote the social value in the game where all sellers in set S have been removed.
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The next definition is the key definition for this paper. The marginal contribution
of seller i to the social welfare is defined as
Mi (θ) , W (θ)−W−i (θ) .
We may also define the marginal contribution of seller i in the game where seller j
has been removed as
M−ji (θ) , W−j (θ)−W−i∪j (θ) .
By MS (θ) , we denote the marginal contribution of a coalition S of sellers:
MS (θ) , W (θ)−W−S (θ) .
Finally, we introduce notation
W (θ |k ) , Mi (θ |k ) , etc.
to describe the social values and marginal contributions along paths that start with
an arbitrary alternative k in the initial period, but follow the (conditionally) socially
optimal path in all subsequent periods.
3 Finite Horizon Equilibrium
In this section, we present three examples that illustrate how changes in the competi-
tive positions of the sellers can have problematic consequences for the efficiency of the
equilibrium. The first example addresses direct intertemporal externalities between
the sellers. The second and third example consider independent reward payoffs and
illustrate the role of fixed finite horizons for the competition of the sellers.
Consider first an example where three sellers, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} are selling a good to a
buyer with unit demands per period in a two-period economy. To fix ideas, assume
that the first firm sells champagne, the second red wine and the third a dessert wine.
9
Assume also that the first glass results in a utility of u for the buyer regardless of the
specific choice, or:
xi (0) = u > 0 for all i.
The twist in this example comes from the fact that after consuming the wine of seller
i, the consumer only wants to consume the wine of seller i+ 1 whose product yields
utility v, and we assume that δv > u. The second glass of wine thus has a higher
discounted utility than the first glass. (All summations and subtractions on the set
of sellers are to be interpreted as modulo 3 in this section.) No other choice gives any
utility to the buyer in period 1.
Observe that in this model there are no externalities in the stage game between
the different sellers, but obviously the sales of one producer affect the values of other
sellers in future periods. We solve for equilibria in the model by backwards induction.
Denote by VB (j) , Vi (j) the continuation payoffs to the buyer and seller i in the
second period, respectively, if j was the seller in period 0. The cautious equilibrium
payoffs in period 1 are given by Vi (j) = v if j = {i− 1} and Vi (j) = 0 otherwise.
In other words, only the seller who has the desirable product in period 1 makes a
positive profit equal to the value of the product. In the cautious equilibrium, we
also have that VB (j) = u if j = 0, and VB (j) = 0 otherwise. Notice that if the buyer
chose not to make a selection in period 0, then the sellers remain symmetric in period
1 and competition leaves the buyer with all the surplus.
In order to show that this game does not have any cautious equilibria, it is sufficient
(by symmetry) to show that there is no cautious equilibrium where seller 1 makes
the sale in the first period. To this end, assume to the contrary that seller 1 makes
a sale in the first period in a cautious equilibrium. Then by Bertrand pricing, the
buyer must be indifferent between buying from seller 1 and another action. There
are three possibilities: the indifference can hold vis-a-vis the second seller, the third
seller or the option of not buying. The following argument shows that none of these
alternatives is consistent with a cautious equilibrium.
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First assume that the buyer is indifferent between seller 1 and 2. The equilibrium
indifference condition for the buyer is given by
u− p1 + δ0 = u− p2 + δ0,
and hence requires that:
p1 = p2.
On the other hand, cautious pricing implies for seller 2 that he is indifferent between
making a sale today and making a sale tomorrow, or
p2 = δv
But by assumption δv > u, and hence we are lead to
u− p1 = u− p2 < 0,
contradicting optimality for the buyer.
Next assume that the indifference is between sellers 1 and 3. Then again p1 = p3
by buyer indifference and p3 = 0 by cautious pricing, as seller 3 will not be able
to make a sale after seller 1 was chosen in period 0. But then seller 1 can gain by
deviating to a higher price, leaving the buyer to seller 3 in period 0 and allowing seller
1 to extract a payoff of δv > u in the subsequent period.
The remaining possibility is that the buyer is indifferent between seller 1 and not
buying. The buyer’s indifference in this case requires that
u− p1 = δu, or p1 = (1− δ)u.
But then seller 3 can undercut profitably by setting
p3 = (1− δ)u− ε.
As a result, this two period game does not have cautious equilibria. It should be
noted that this game does have a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.
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For example, first period prices p1 = p2 = p3 = 0 are consistent with equilibrium if
the buyer is to choose seller 1 on equilibrium path and following any deviations by
either seller 2 or 3. If seller 1 deviates, then the buyer should buy from seller 2. It is
easily verified that this configuration is sequentially rational, but seller 2 is not using
a cautious strategy.
The problem arises in this example because sales by seller i in period t have a
direct impact on the rewards from the sales by seller j in period t+1. Such dependence
is a clear manifestation of an intertemporal externality between the sellers, and there
is no a priori reason to believe that such externalities can be dealt with in a model
where transaction prices are the only transfer instruments. For this reason we ruled
out externalities of this type with the assumption of independent rewards. It removes
direct intertemporal externalities between the sellers.
The next two examples are meant to show that within finite horizon models,
there is a subtle, but important indirect externality even under the assumption of
independent rewards. Consider first a model with three firms where the payoffs are
given by the following matrix:
x1 (·) x2 (·) x3 (·)
ti = 0 2 2 0
ti = 1 0 0 3
The table reads as follows for alternative 1. The payoff from alternative 1 is 2 when
it is has never been used before, or t1 = 0 and 0 when it has been used once before,
or t1 = 1. The fixed time horizon is assumed to be given by T = 1 and the discount
factor δ is close to one. The efficient allocation would prescribe seller 1 and 2 to each
realize their high valuation 2, however in the unique cautious equilibrium seller 3 is
successful in period 0 and 1. To see why there cannot be an efficient equilibrium note
that if alternative 1 or 2 is chosen in the first period, then the outside option value
from alternative 3 vanishes altogether. This implies that the buyer cannot guarantee
herself any surplus in period 1. By setting price −2 (1− δ)− ε in t = 0, seller 3 can
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guarantee the buyer a higher total payoff than what is individually rational for either
of the two sellers. Two points are worth observing here. First, because of the finite
time horizon, the outside option value offered by a given seller changes over time even
when that seller is not chosen. Second, the equilibria would be quite different if the
sellers were allowed to write binding contracts with the buyer.
The next example shows that even when the game has an efficient equilibrium, it
need not be unique. Consider the following two alternatives with a payoff stream as
described below:
x1 (·) x2 (·)
ti = 0 1 + ε 1
ti = 1 0 0
where ε > 0. The fixed time horizon is again given by T = 1 and the discount factor is
again δ close to one. In this game, it is possible to support a period 0 choice of 1 as well
as a choice of 2 in cautious equilibrium. To see how the inefficient equilibrium arises,
we observe first that the buyer can always guarantee herself a payoff of δ by refusing
all offers in period 0. By refusing all offers in period 0, the buyer puts the sellers in
very competitive position in period 0 and will receive a (discounted) payoff of δ · 1 in
the unique cautious equilibrium of the continuation game. We can now establish a
cautious equilibrium in period 0 where seller 2 offers a price p2 = 1 − δ and seller 1
prices cautiously at p1 = δ (1 + ε) . It is easy to verify that for δ ≈ 1+ 1, these prices
induce the buyer to select seller 2 in period 0. Obviously a similar equilibrium can be
constructed where period 0 sales are made by seller 1. In this example, multiplicity
arises since sales by firm i increase future profitability of firm j and as a result, there
is little incentive to compete for the buyer in the first period. Notice that in both of
the examples above, the buyer has a period 0 choice available that reduces the rents
of the efficient sellers. In the first example, this choice (i.e. seller 3) is exercised in
equilibrium, in the second example, this choice (seller 0) serves only as an outside
option. But in both cases, the competitiveness of the situation was raised by reducing
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the number of periods in which the sellers could offer their product. In contrast, in
an infinite horizon environment, the buyer can only postpone, but never completely
eliminate periods of sale.
Finally, it is interesting to note that if the firms were allowed to bid in menu
contracts as in Bergemann & Va¨lima¨ki (2003), then all of the equilibria in both games
would satisfy allocative efficiency. Hence we conclude that restricting our attention
to equilibria in dynamic (spot) prices may induce efficiency losses in the model, and
this motivate the use of more sophisticated contracts in such environments.
4 Infinite Horizon Equilibrium
In demonstrating the existence of an efficient equilibrium, we make use of the guess
and verify method of dynamic programming. In this approach, we assume that the
equilibrium path is socially efficient after all possible histories. Furthermore, we
assume that each seller is paid her marginal contribution in equilibrium. In other
words, each seller j gets as her payoff the difference of the social surplus in the
model and the social surplus in the model where seller j has been removed. These
assumptions pin down the price of the successful seller and the buyer’s purchasing
decision at all histories. The remaining prices can be recovered from the requirement
of cautious pricing. The main task is then to verify that no individual in the model
has an incentive to deviate from this guess.
In this section we derive sufficient conditions for the existence of an efficient cau-
tious equilibrium where the sellers’ equilibrium payoffs coincide with their marginal
contributions. These conditions relate to the properties of the social value function
and the marginal contributions. We shall then verify these properties in Section 5
which studies the social programs rather than the equilibrium programs. We assume
from now on that the model satisfies independent rewards.
The equilibrium conditions can be written as follows. The (weak) indifference
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conditions for the buyer with i as the successful seller are:
xi (θ)− pi (θ) + δVB (θ, i) ≥ xj (θ)− pj (θ) + δVB (θ, j) , ∀j 6= i, (1)
where the inequality holds for at least one seller, say k 6= i, as an equality,
xi (θ)− pi (θ) + δVB (θ, i) = xk (θ)− pk (θ) + δVB (θ, k) . (2)
The conditions imposed by cautiousness on the pricing policies are
pj (θ) = δVj (θ, i)− δVj (θ, j) , (3)
and
pi (θ) ≥ δVi (θ, k)− δVi (θ, i) . (4)
In this section, we seek to derive conditions for an efficient equilibrium and i shall
always identify the socially efficient seller.
We now guess that the equilibrium value function for each seller j is her marginal
contribution, or:
Vj (θt) = Mj (θt) . (5)
We then verify that the guess, expressed by (5), actually satisfies the efficient equi-
librium conditions (1)-(4). With the guess we can rewrite the conditions as:
xi (θ)− pi (θ) + δ
(
W (θ, i)−
I∑
l=1
Ml (θ, i)
)
(6)
≥ xj (θ)− pj (θ) + δ
(
W (θ, j)−
I∑
l=1
Ml (θ, j)
)
, ∀j 6= i,
with at least one inequality holding as equality, and
pj (θ) = δMj (θ, i)− δMj (θ, j) , (7)
and
pi (θ) ≥ δMi (θ, k)− δMi (θ, i) .
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We first derive sufficient conditions for the indifference condition of the buyer. We
do this by guessing that the inequality (1) is satisfied as an equality for the seller who
would be the socially optimal seller in the absence of i. We denote this seller by j−i.
As the marginal contribution property is conjectured to hold in every continuation
game, the price of the winning seller i in period t has to be:
pi (θ) = xi (θ)− xj−i (θ) + δW−i (θ, i)− δW−i
(
θ, j−i
)
. (8)
xj−i (θ)− δW−i (θ, i) + δW−i
(
θ, j−i
)
+ δ
(
W (θ, i)−
I∑
l=1
Ml (θ, i)
)
= xj−i (θ)− δMj (θ, i) + δMj
(
θ, j−i
)
+ δ
(
W
(
θ, j−i
)− I∑
l=1
Ml
(
θ, j−i
))
Using the definition of W−i (·) and after cancellations on both sides, we are left with
the equality: ∑
l 6=i,j−i
δMl (θ, i) =
∑
l 6=i,j−i
δMl
(
θ, j−i
)
. (9)
This equality involves the marginal contributions of all sellers with the exception
of the two most efficient sellers, i and j−i. It states that the sum of the marginal
contributions of these sellers is the same whether the current selection is i or j−i. As
all these sellers are less efficient than either i or j−i, each one of them will be chosen
along the efficient path only after i and j−i have been selected initially. From the
point of view of these less efficient sellers then, both i and j−i will precede them and
hence their contribution will only arise after the selection of i and j−i. Hence from
their point of view, it should not matter whether i or j−i is chosen first. We therefore
conjecture that the marginal contribution of each seller l is unaffected by the order
in which i and j−i are chosen and thus:
Ml (θ, i) = Ml
(
θ, j−i
)
,
which would clearly be sufficient to support the equality (9).
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Let us next consider the remaining indifference conditions for the buyer, namely
his choice between i and all sellers with the exception of j−i. Naturally it is now
sufficient to establish that the indifference conditions hold as inequalities rather than
equalities. To achieve this, we do not insert the candidate equilibrium price of the
winning seller i but a hypothetical price which allows for an easier comparison. Use
pi,j (θ) to denote the following:
pi,j (θ) , xi (θ)− xj (θ) + δW−i (θ, i)− δW−i (θ, j) . (10)
The price pi,j (θ) represent the differential social value of i compared to j if i were to
be removed form the set of alternatives beginning tomorrow. By subtraction, we get
the following relation between pi,j (θ) and pi (θ):
pi,j (θ)− pi (θ) = xj−i (θ) + δW−i
(
θ, j−i
)− xj (θ)− δW−i (θ, j) ≥ 0.
The last inequality holds since alternative j−i is the efficient alternative in the absence
of i and hence the social value generated by the choice of j−i is larger than the choice
of any other alternative j in the absence of i. As we insert the prices (7) and (10 )
into the indifference condition (6), we arrive again at an expression which involves
only the social values and the marginal contributions, namely:
xj−i (θ) + δW
−i (θ, j−i)− xj (θ)− δW−i (θ, j) ≥ δ∑
l 6=i,j
[Ml (θ, i)−Ml (θ, j)] .
By adding Mi (θ) − Mi (θ |j ) on both sides, we return to the social value with all
sellers, including i and the above inequality becomes:
W (θ)−W (θ |j ) ≥
∑
l 6=j
[Ml (θ)−Ml (θ |j )] . (11)
Inequality (11) is our second sufficient condition and it has an intuitive interpre-
tation. It states that the social gains of moving from an inefficient allocation j to
the efficient allocation i is larger than the gains arising for the same change in the
marginal contributions. Since we want to interpret the marginal contributions as the
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payoffs to the sellers, the condition simply says that the efficiency loss in choosing an
inefficient seller exceeds the reduction in future payoffs to other sellers, or in other
words, efficiency losses outweigh rent extraction gains.
The verification of the equilibrium condition for the sellers is straightforward. In
a cautious equilibrium, the losing sellers (weakly) prefer sales by i to making sales
on their own by construction. It remains to verify that the winning seller i prefers to
make a seller rather than to concede the market to another seller j. By the equilibrium
hypothesis, seller i receives his marginal contribution in every subgame, and thus a
sufficient condition for optimality can be stated as:
Mi (θ) ≥ δMi (θ, l) , ∀l 6= i.
This is the final sufficient condition that we need for our construction of an equilib-
rium. It simply says that the marginal contribution of agent i is maximized along the
efficient path. We thus have established the following result:
Theorem 1 (Existence)
An MPE in cautious strategies which is (i) efficient and (ii) displays marginal con-
tribution payoffs exists provided that the marginal contributions satisfy:
1. Mi (θ |k ) = Mi (θ) if k is chosen prior to i on the efficient path;
2. Mi (θ |k ) ≤Mi (θ) if i is chosen prior to k on the efficient path;
3. W (θ)−W (θ |k ) ≥∑j∈I\k (Mj (θ)−Mj (θ |k )).
In the next section we verify that in the model with independent rewards, the
marginal contributions satisfy all three properties listed in Theorem 1.
5 Marginal Contributions
The verification of the sufficient conditions derived in Theorem 1 involves the com-
parisons of four different, yet related, social programs. The determination of the
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marginal contribution of each alternative occurs through the value of the social pro-
gram when all alternatives are available and the social program when all alternatives
but alternative j are available. The verification of the equilibrium choice of the buyer
requires a comparison of the social welfare loss with the private welfare losses of the
sellers. The potential social loss is induced by a single suboptimal deviation towards
the alternative k, which requires the computation of the conditional optimal value
following the choice of k. Finally, as the private welfare losses are measured by the
marginal contributions and as those are obtained as the difference of social values, we
also have to establish the value of the program without j and an initial suboptimal
choice of k. The (conditionally) optimal assignments which arise in these various
problems are denoted respectively by a : Θ → I, aj : Θ → I\{j}, ak : Θ → I and
akj : Θ → I\{j}. The relationship between them are represented in the following
diagram:
social loss
marginal
contribution
of j
︷ ︸︸ ︷
a (·) ←→ ak (·)
l l
aj (·) akj (·)

marginal
contribution
of j
(with suboptimal k)
The main difference between these policies arises with respect to the calendar time
at which the ti-th realization of alternative i will be employed. The argument that
we present needs careful tracking of the calendar time t as well as the usage time ti
of seller i. We recall that we denote by ti (θ) the number of times that alternative i
has been used at state θ. We describe by t (i, ti) the calendar time in which the ti−th
realization of alternative i is used in the optimal program. Similarly, we denote by
t (i, ti |−j ), t (i, ti |k ) and t (i, ti |k,−j ) the calendar time in which the ti−th realiza-
tion of alternative i is employed in the program without j, in the suboptimal program
starting with k, and in the suboptimal program starting with k and without alter-
native j, respectively. The comparison between the different programs can then be
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usefully reduced to a comparison of the calendar times in which a given a realization
of alternative i is employed across the different programs.
5.1 Example
Before we set out to verify the validity of the sufficient conditions within the gen-
eral model, we consider a very simple environment. The simplicity of the example
facilitates the tracking of the calendar times at which the alternatives are employed
across the different programs. The evident structure of the allocation problem then
provides transparency to the proof of the sufficient conditions. Consider the following
specification:
xi (ti) =
 xi, if ti = 0,0, if ti > 0,
and suppose further that
x0 > x1 > ... > xI > 0.
In other words, each alternative generates a positive value at its first use and thereafter
generates zero value. The socially optimal continuation policy is therefore to employ
in every period the alternative j with the highest remaining valuation. The socially
optimal policy starting at t = 0 is to select each alternative exactly in the order of
their valuations. The path of the optimal policy is thus described by a (t) = t. Here,
the descending order of the alternatives allows us to identify each alternative i with
the time period in which it is employed along the efficient path.
The social value of the efficient program in period 0 can then be written as
W (θ0) =
∞∑
t=0
δtxt.
As there is only a finite number of sellers and hence strictly positive realizations, for
all t ≥ I, we have xt = 0.
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The marginal contribution of seller j is given by
Mj (θ0) = W (θ0)−W−j (θ0) =
∞∑
t=0
δtxt −
j−1∑
t=0
δtxt −
∞∑
t=j+1
δt−1xt
=
∞∑
t=j
δt (xt − xt+1) . (12)
As one might have expected, the removal of alternative j does not change the value
in the programs before the arrival of j in the socially efficient program. However, if
we remove alternative j, the immediate consequence is that we have to use the next
best alternative, which is alternative j + 1. By extension, we will be forced in all
future periods to move one of the less efficient alternatives up by exactly one period,
and this accounts for the sum of discounted differences starting in period j. In other
words, the social benefit of seller j propagates into all future periods as the existence
of alternative j permits all subsequent and less valuable alternatives to make their
appearance exactly on period later.
The social value of the suboptimal program which starts with alternative k can
also be represented as a variation of the efficient social program by simply forwarding
the appropriate time indices as:
W (θ0 |k ) = xk +
k−1∑
t=0
δt+1xt +
∞∑
t=k+1
δtxt.
The suboptimal anticipation of seller k changes the social values in two ways: (i) seller
k appears k periods too early and (ii) all sellers ranked before k appear one period
too late relative to the social optimum. After k+1 periods, the optimal social policy
catches up with the suboptimal policy and the values thereafter are identical. The
rearrangement of the order in which the alternatives are selected due to the initial
suboptimal deviation is depicted in the following figure for k = 3:
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t = 0 1 2 3 4 5 · · ·
a (t) = 0 1 2 3 4 5 · · ·
a (t |k ) = 3 0 1 2 4 5 · · ·
Table 1: Allocation Times along Optimal and Suboptimal Paths
Finally, the marginal contribution of seller j in a suboptimal program can be
represented by a combination of the forward and backward operation. Consider first
the case in which alternative j would be employed after alternative k in the efficient
program, or j > k. The marginal contribution of j is given by:
Mj (θ0 |k ) = W (θ0 |k )−W−j (θ0 |k )
=
∞∑
t=j
δt (xt − xt+1) . (13)
As alternative k is used in the optimal as well as in the suboptimal program before
alternative j, the marginal contribution of alternative j should remain identical across
these two program and this is easily verified by comparing (12) and (13).
If alternative j arrives before alternative k in the efficient program, then the
marginal contribution in the suboptimal program is:
Mj (θ0 |k ) = W (θ0 |k )−W−j (θ0 |k )
=
k−2∑
t=j
δt+1 (xt − xt+1) + δk (xk−1 − xk+1) +
∞∑
t=k+1
δt (xt − xt+1) .
The effect of a suboptimal allocation on the marginal contribution of seller j is now
similar to the one imposed on the social value. The distinction arises due to the fact
that the marginal contribution is expressed in differences rather than absolute values:
(i) the suboptimal anticipation of k delays the arrival of benefits due to seller j by one
period, (ii) as k has been anticipated the marginal benefit in period k is then between
xk−1 and the next available alternative xk+1, (iii) at t = k + 1 the socially optimal
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program catches up with the suboptimal program and the third term is identical in
both expressions. The difference in the marginal contributions for j < k can then be
expressed as:
Mj (θ0)−Mj (θ0 |k ) = (1− δ)
k−1∑
t=j
δt (xt − xt+1) . (14)
An initial and inefficient assignment of seller l then depresses the contribution of seller
j through a sequence of one period delays in the accrual of the marginal values of
seller k.
Based on these simple computations we can now verify that all three sufficient
conditions in Theorem 1 hold. The first sufficient condition, namely that for j > k,
Mj (θ0) = Mj (θ0 |k ) , is verified by simply comparing (12) and (13). The second
sufficient condition, Mj (θ0) − Mj (θ0 |k ) ≥ 0 for j < k, was established by (14)
coupled with the observation that xt−xt+1 > 0 for all t. The third and final sufficient
condition:
W (θ0)−W (θ0 |k ) ≥
∑
j∈I
(Mj (θt)−Mj (θt |k )) , (15)
is readily established as well. The difference in the value between the optimal and
the suboptimal program is given by:
W (θ0)−W (θ0 |k ) = (1− δ)
k−1∑
t=0
δtxt −
(
1− δk) xk. (16)
The inequality (15) can be expressed, using (14) and (16 ), and dividing both sides
by (1− δ) as:
k−1∑
j=0
(
δjxj − δkxk
) ≥ k−1∑
j=0
k−1∑
t=j
δt (xt − xt+1) .
It is easy to verify that the inequality holds when we consider every element indexed
with j separately, or
δjxj − δkxk ≥
k−1∑
t=j
δt (xt − xt+1) . (17)
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We notice that without discounting, i.e. for δ = 1, both sides equalize as the rhs is
simply a telescopic expansion of the difference of the lhs. But for δ < 1, the inequality
becomes in fact strict. The lhs of (17) expresses for every xj with j < k, the value
difference between xj and xk weighted with the appropriate discount factors of the
optimal program:
δjxj − δkxk > 0.
The rhs also presents for every xj a differential expression between xj and xk, but it
proceeds in steps δt (xt − xt+1) which are increasingly discounted. This reflects the
value difference between xj and xk but now in terms of the marginal contribution.
Since the marginal contribution only picks up the inframarginal differences in every
period, it follows directly that the inequality (17) holds.
5.2 Optimal Index Policies
We now proceed to prove the three properties of the marginal contributions within
thegeneral payoff environment. The basic argument will follow exactly along the
lines suggested by the example. But to pursue this argument, we have to use the
structure of the optimal policies to bring the general model closer to the example.
We will do this in three steps. The first step, carried out in Lemma 1 and 2, will
show that the decreasing sequence of payoffs in the example is in essence without loss
of generality. The second step, carried out in Lemma 3 and 4, will show that among
all possible continuation paths following an initial and suboptimal use of alternative
k, the one which returns immediately to the initial and unconditionally optimal path
is the critical path. The third step, carried out in Lemma 5, will show that the
marginal contributions and the difference in the marginal contribution from optimal
and suboptimal path are superadditive. This final argument will allow us to reduce
the rent extraction inequality to a particularly simple case. Finally it should be
emphasized that all arguments in this section will be based on the properties of
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optimal policies in single agent allocation problems and no equilibrium arguments
will be needed.
We recall that the payoff of each alternative i is a function of its own past use
only. We defined the payoff stream xi (ti) to depend only on the number of times, ti,
alternative i has been used in the past. For each alternative i and each state ti we
can define an index of its future value through an optimal stopping problem. The
optimal stopping time for alternative i in state ti, denoted by τ i (ti), is defined as the
solution to the following problem:
τ i (ti) ∈ argmax
τ i≥ti
{∑τ i
si=ti
δsixi (si)∑τ i
si=ti
δsi
}
. (18)
If the maximization problem (18) allows for multiple solutions for τ i, then we identify
τ i (ti) to be the largest time among the maximizers. We define the index of alternative
i, Xi (ti), as the discounted average under the optimal stopping time, or
Xi (ti) , max
τ i≥ti
{∑τ i
si=ti
δsixi (si)∑τ i
si=ti
δsi
}
. (19)
With these preliminaries in place, it is straightforward to characterize the (condition-
ally) optimal programs.
Lemma 1 (Optimal Policies)
1. The (conditionally) optimal assignment in state θ is determined by
argmax
i
{Xi (ti (θ))} .
2. For all i j, k, l (all distinct) and all ti, tj :
t (i, ti) < t (j, tj) ⇔ t (i, ti |k ) < t (j, tj |k )
⇔ t (i, ti |−l ) < t (j, tj |−l )
⇔ t (i, ti |k,−l ) < t (j, tj |k,−l ) .
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Proof. See appendix.
The first part of Lemma 1 simply restates the celebrated Gittins index theorem
for deterministic payoff streams. The index characterization depends only on the
properties of the payoff streams of the individual alternatives. As a consequence of the
index property, the subsequent parts state that the order in which the alternatives are
optimally employed is invariant to the removal of some alternatives or the suboptimal
initial use of alternative k.
A further consequence of the optimality of the index policy is stated next. For
each alternative i, we define inductively a sequence of stopping times {τni }∞n=0 as
follows. Define τ 0i , −1, and let
τn+1i ∈ argmax
s>τni
{∑s
ti=τni +1
δtixi (ti)∑s
ti=τni +1
δti
}
. (20)
As before, if the maximization problem (20) allows for multiple solutions for τn+1i ,
then we identify τn+1i to be the largest time among the maximizers. With this induc-
tively defined sequence of stopping times, we can associate average rewards between
stopping times as follows:
xn+1i ,
∑τn+1i
ti=τni +1
δtixi (ti)∑τn+1i
ti=τni +1
δti
. (21)
In contrast to the earlier stopping times and average discounted rewards in ( 18)
and (19), the stopping times defined by (20) are not recalculated at every clock time
ti, but only from stopping time τ
n
i to stopping time τ
n+1
i . Similarly, the average
discounted rewards defined by (21) are only calculated between stopping times.
Lemma 2 (Decreasing Valuations)
1. The average returns xni are decreasing in n.
2. The tail realizations, with τni < s ≤ τn+1i , satisfy:∑τn+1i
ti=s δ
tixi (ti)∑τn+1i
ti=s δ
ti
≥ xn+1i .
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Proof. See appendix.
The relevance of Lemma 2 is easiest to understand if we start with the second
result. It says that between any two stopping times, τni and τ
n+1
i , the discounted
average reward until τn+1i must be at least as large as it was when evaluated starting
from time ti = τ
n
i . The optimal index policy , stated in Lemma 1, then implies that
if it was optimal to use i starting at ti = τ
n
i , then it will remain optimal to use
alternative i uninterrupted at least until ti = τ
n+1
i is reached. The first result of
Lemma 2 then states that when the discounted averages are taken along the stopping
times, then the average returns from alternative i are decreasing over time. By the
index policy, it follows that the sequence of averages across agents will also decrease
over time.
Next we consider a particular alternative k which is used in the suboptimal pro-
gram W (θ0 |k ). We know from Lemma 1 that the initial use of the suboptimal k will
not change the order in which the remaining alternatives are selected in the optimal
continuation program, but it may change repeatedly the time at which they are se-
lected. This is due to the fact that the initial, even if suboptimal use of k, may make
the future use of k more desirable and thus further delay the employment of the other
alternatives. The source of this complication is the fact that after the initial use of
xk = xk (0), the average value of the tail realization of xk (0) may increase and be
larger than xk (0) so that for s > 0∑τ1k
tk=s
δtkxk (tk)∑τ1k
tk=s
δtk
> xk (0) .
In this case, the index policy may recommend the use of alternative k earlier than
it would have if xk (0) had not been removed through its suboptimally early use
in period 0. (The payoff xk (0) now constitutes a sunk cost in order to reach the
higher payoffs xk (tk).) As the index of alternative k for all tail realizations stays
above the original index, we cannot rule out that the initial suboptimal use of k
leads to many early (relative to the optimal program) usage times of the alternative
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k. The occurrence of such repeated changes makes the comparison between W (θ0)
and W (θ0 |k ) notationally cumbersome. It is therefore desirable to find instances
for the payoff stream of xk (tk) in which the changes between W (θ0) and W (θ0 |k )
are minimal. The only payoff stream for alternative k which can guarantee this and
still obtain an average return of x1k for an arbitrary stopping time τ
1
k is the constant
sequence:
xk (0) = xk (1) = ... = xk
(
τ 1k
)
= x1k, (22)
where the last equality is the result of the averaging over a constant sequence. With
such a constant sequence, the average value and hence index of all tail realization is
constant and equal to the initial value. In consequence, the optimal continuation path
after the initial suboptimal choice of k is easy to describe. It will simply continue
where the optimal path would have started. Moreover, beginning with the time period
where the optimal continuation path uses the alternative k again, the path of optimal
and suboptimal path will be identical again.
In this respect, if we compare the program W (θ0) and W (θ0 |k ), the only real-
izations of alternative i which matter are those which are realized optimally before
the alternative k is used for the first time. It is then useful to introduce an auxiliary
allocation problem, where all realizations of alternative i which would occur after the
first use of alternative k are set equal to zero, or:
xki (ti) =
 xi (ti) , if t (ti) < t (tk = 0)0 if t (ti) > t (tk = 0) (23)
and all realizations of alternative k are set equal to x1k:
xki (tk) = x
1
k for all tk. (24)
We refer to the allocation problem with the payoffs in (23) and (24) as the k- truncated
allocation problem. We add the superscript k to the payoff realizations and the social
values, W k (θ0), to indicate the modification in the payoffs.
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We now establish a relationship between our original allocation model and this
specifically modified allocation model.
Lemma 3 (Truncated Allocation Problem)
If xk (tk) displays constant payoffs for all tk with 0 ≤ tk ≤ τ 1k, then
1. for all k,
1
1− δ (W (θ0)−W (θ0 |k )) = W
k (θ0)− 1
1− δx
1
k;
2. for all k and all i,
1
1− δ (Mi (θ0)−Mi (θ0 |k )) = M
k
i (θ0) .
Proof. See appendix.
We can now show that the constant sequence of realizations for alternative k is the
critical sequence to analyze for the purpose of establishing the sufficient conditions
of the marginal contribution equilibrium.
Lemma 4 (Minimal Loss Payoff Stream)
1. For all k, W (θ0 |k )is maximized with xk (0) = ... = xk (τ 1k).
2. For all i and k, Mi (θ0 |k ) is maximized with xk (0) = ... = xk (τ 1k).
Proof. See appendix.
A final useful fact about the marginal contributions is stated next.
Lemma 5 (Superadditive Marginal Contributions)
1. For all i and j,
Mi (θ0) +Mj (θ0) ≤Mi∪j (θ0) .
2. For all i, j and k, all distinct;,
Mi (θ0)−Mi (θ0 |k ) +Mj (θ0)−Mj (θ0 |k ) ≤Mi∪j (θ0)−Mi∪j (θ0 |k ) .
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Proof. See appendix.
The first results says that the marginal contribution of i and j jointly exceed the
sum of the marginal contributions of i and j individually. This is rather intuitive as
the removal of alternative i leaves the social program with the possibility to use j,
but once i and j are removed jointly, the social program will have to immediately use
the possible inferior alternative k. It can be shown that the superadditivity property
of the marginal contributions is equivalent to
Mi (θ0) ≤M−ji (θ) , for all i and j.
This inequality is perhaps even more intuitive as it says that the contribution of alter-
native i to the social program becomes more valuable after the removal of alternative
j from the choice set. The superadditivity property extends to the difference of the
marginal contributions arising from optimal and suboptimal program, and it this in-
equality which we will use for the next theorem. With these preliminaries in place,
we are ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 2 (Marginal Contributions)
The marginal contributions of the infinite horizon game with independent rewards
satisfy the sufficient conditions of Theorem 1:
1. Mi (θ0 |k ) = Mi (θ0) if t(k, 1) < t(i, 1);
2. Mi (θ0 |k ) ≤Mi (θ0) if t(i, 1) < t(k, 1);
3. W (θ0)−W (θ0 |k ) ≥
∑
j∈I\k (Mj (θ0)−Mj (θ0 |k )) .
Proof. See appendix.
This theorem establishes that the infinite horizon model with independent rewards
always possesses an equilibrium with strong welfare predictions. The equilibrium path
is socially efficient and all the sellers receive their marginal contribution. A further
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welfare consequence of the marginal contribution property is that (i) the sellers have
the socially optimal ex ante incentives for making surplus enhancing investments and
(ii) the buyer has the socially correct incentives for investments that increase surplus
in all purchases. In the job market context this implies that efficiency results if the
firms pay for job specific training and the workers pay for general training.
In the next section, we turn to the issue of uniqueness of these equilibria.
6 Uniqueness
In this section, we address the issue of uniqueness in the infinite horizon model. We
assume first that for all i, there exists a Ti < ∞ and an xi such that for all ti ≥ Ti,
xi (ti) = xi. This assumption implies that along any Markov perfect equilibrium path,
the payoffs become static after some finite number of periods. Formally, let
Ti = min{ti |xi (si) = xi for some xi and all si ≥ ti}. (25)
With this assumption, we analyze the game by backwards induction in the state
space.
Theorem 3 (Uniqueness)
The marginal contribution equilibrium is the unique cautious Markov perfect equilib-
rium of the dynamic price competition game if for all i, there exists Ti < ∞ and xi
such that for all ti ≥ Ti, xi (ti) = xi.
Proof. See appendix.
It should be pointed out that we do not know of any counterexamples to the
uniqueness of equilibria in games which do not satisfy the above assumption of even-
tual constancy. While we have not been able to prove the uniqueness without the use
of backward induction arguments based on continuation payoffs, we conjecture that
the uniqueness holds even in games where constancy assumption (25) fails, provided,
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of course, we maintain the independent rewards condition. The basic difficulty in
proving uniqueness for the general model stems from the fact that when the continu-
ation paths are inefficient, very little can be said about the exact form of individual
continuation payoffs. The best way to see this is to recall the examples in Section
3. For an arbitrary continuation path, there is no reason to believe that the cau-
tious equilibrium choice in period t would be uniquely defined. It might seem that
by letting Ti → ∞ for all i, we could make use of arguments based on continuity
at infinity.3 Yet, while this approach would supply us with an alternative way for
proving the existence of a marginal contribution equilibrium in the general model, it
does not provide us with an argument for uniqueness.
The final point to note is that the scope of the uniqueness result is narrower than in
the main result of Bergemann & Va¨lima¨ki (1996). The uniqueness here pertains only
to Markov perfect equilibria in cautious strategies whereas the previous result held for
all MPE of the game with two sellers. The reason for this is that with three or more
sellers, continuation payoffs resulting from strategies that do not satisfy cautiousness
may violate the marginal contribution property. To see this, consider the following
simple example and assume for simplicity that δ ≈ 1 :
x1 (·) x2 (·) x3 (·)
ti = 0 1 + ε 1 ε
ti = 1 0 0 0
.
Efficiency requires that 1 is chosen first, 2 next and 3 in the final period. The game
has, however, inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in strategies that are not cautious.
To see this, observe that seller 3 can transfer all the surplus to the buyer by suitable
non-cautious pricing. If he uses such a strategy in the continuation game following
the choice of 3 in the first period, and if all other continuation games are played
according to the marginal contribution equilibrium, then for ε small, there is an
equilibrium where seller 3 is chosen in the first period.
3See e.g. Fudenberg & Levine (1983) and Harris (1985) for discussions of such arguments.
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7 Conclusion
This paper shows that much of the intuition obtained in the static price competition
games extends to the stationary infinite horizon case as long as externalities between
sellers are ruled out. In particular, the stationary infinite horizon model possesses
an efficient equilibrium where all of the sellers receive their marginal contribution as
their equilibrium payoff. The finite horizon case is, however, quite different. Efficient
equilibria do not exist in general, and the games may have multiple cautious equilibria.
The arguments in the stationary infinite horizon case are based on a version of
the Gittins index theorem for the optimal scheduling of tasks. The most important
consequence of this is that the optimal paths in the model satisfy the following in-
variance property: if along the optimal path, a purchase is made from seller i prior
to seller j, then it cannot be the case that j is used prior to i in a game where the
stage rewards of players other than i and j have been modified. Since the Gittins
index theorem is also valid in the stochastic case (as long as the stage rewards are sta-
tistically independent across sellers), the arguments given in the paper remain valid
in that case as well. The only modification needed is that in the calculation of the
optimal number of times that a seller is used, we must consider random rather than
deterministic stopping times.
There are a number of directions for extending our analysis. A possible formula-
tion that would be consistent with our insistence on no static or dynamic externalities
between the sellers would be to allow xi (·) to depend on calendar time in addition to
ti. For example, one could have a time to build before a new sale can be made (this
would be relevant for many industries such as ship building where capacity utilization
and securing a constant stream of purchases are of primary importance). Such mod-
els could also capture many of the dynamic issues arising in the sales of renewable
resources. Pursuing these extensions is left for future work.
33
8 Appendix
The proofs for all results are collected in the appendix.
Proof of Lemma 1. (1.) This is simply a statement of the optimality of the Gittins
index policy in the special case of deterministic payoff stream, see Whittle (1982) or
Gittins (1989) for a statement in the general stochastic case.
(2.) The relationships follow immediately from the nature of the index policy. As
the index of alternative i and j are computed on the basis of their respective payoff
streams exclusively, their index is invariant to the addition or removal of additional
alternative. As the indices are invariant, the relative order in which alternative i and
j are being employed stays invariant too. The same argument applies naturally for
the optimal continuation path of i and j, when the initial suboptimal choice was k.
Proof of Lemma 2. (1.) The argument is by contradiction. Suppose not and hence
there exists n such that xni < x
n+1
i . This directly contradicts the optimality of τ
n
i as
a solution to (20) since by hypothesis of xni < x
n+1
i :∑τn+1i
ti=τ
n−1
i +1
δtixi (ti)∑τn+1i
ti=τ
n−1
i +1
δti
> xni ,
but this shows that τni cannot be a solution to (20) as setting its value to be equal to
τn+1i is feasible and would obtain a larger average value.
(2.) The argument is again by contradiction. Suppose therefore that there exists
an s with τn−1i < s < τ
n
i such that∑τni
ti=s δ
tixi (ti)∑τni
ti=s δ
ti
< xni .
It follows from averaging that the average during the complement time has to satisfy:∑s−1
ti=τ
n−1
i +1
δtixi (ti)∑
s−1
ti=τ
n−1
i +1
δti
> xni ,
34
for the joint interval to achieve the average xni . But it now follows immediately that
τni cannot be the solution to (20 ) as s − 1 achieves a higher average, contradicting
the fact that τni is a solution to the maximization problem.
Proof of Lemma 3. (1.) For a constant payoff stream of xk (tk) for all tk with
0 ≤ tk ≤ τ 1k, the difference W (θ0)−W (θ0 |k ) can be written as
W (θ0)−W (θ0 |k ) = (1− δ)W tk (θ0)− x1k
(
1− δtk) ,
and after dividing by (1− δ) as
1
1− δ (W (θ0)−W (θ0 |k )) = W
k (θ0)− x
1
k
1− δ .
(2.) We can write the the difference Mj (θ0)−Mj (θ0 |k ) generally as
Mj (θ0)−Mj (θ0 |k )
=
(
W (θ0)−W−j (θ0)
)− (W (θ0 |k )−W−j (θ0 |k )) (26)
= (W (θ0)−W (θ0 |k ))−
(
W−j (θ0)−W−j (θ0 |k )
)
.
For the case of a constant payoff stream of xk (tk) for all tk with 0 ≤ tk ≤ τ 1k, the last
line in (26 ) can be written by the first part of this lemma as(
W k (θ0)− x
1
k
1− δ
)
−
(
W−i,k (θ0)− x
1
k
1− δ
)
= W k (θ0)−W−i,k (θ0) ,
which proves the second part of this lemma.
Proof of Lemma 4. (1.) Suppose not and thus the maximizing solution is obtained
with different payoff stream of alternative k. By the optimality of the stopping times
{τnk}∞n=0, this different payoff stream must have some realization xk (tk) > xk (0) with
tk ≤ τ 1k. Consider then a modified version of this payoff stream, denoted by xˆk (0)
and xˆk (tk), satisfying:
x̂k (0) , xk (0) + εδtk (27)
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and
x̂k (tk) , xk (tk)− ε (28)
with ε > 0. Clearly, the modified payoff stream has the same average return as the
original stream, and for sufficiently small ε, it maintains the same stopping times
{τnk}∞n=0 as the original stream.
Consider then the original term W (θ0 |k ) and the same term under the modi-
fication defined by (27) and (28 ), and denoted by extension as Ŵ (θ0 |k ). As the
stopping times and the average rewards of all alternatives remain unchanged, the
timing in the employment remains unchanged as well. The difference between the
two terms is therefore simply
Ŵ (θ0 |k )−W (θ0 |k ) = εδtk · 1− ε · δt(k,tk|k ). (29)
As tk ≤ t (k, tk |k ), it follows that the constant stream for alternative k can never
decrease the payoff of the program W (θ0 |k ) and increases it if the tk−th realization
of alternative k comes only after some other alternatives, say j, have been realized as
the inequality tk < t (k, tk |k ) then becomes strict.
(2.) The marginal contribution of i under the suboptimal choice of k is given by
Mi (θ0 |k ) = W (θ0 |k ) −W−i (θ0 |k ). Again, suppose that the maximizing solution
is obtained with different payoff stream of alternative k. We then look at a modified
payoff stream of alternative k as described by ( 27) and (28). Consider then the
difference
M̂i (θ0 |k )−Mi (θ0 |k ) =
[
Ŵ (θ0 |k )− Ŵ−i (θ0 |k )
]
− [W (θ0 |k )−W−i (θ0 |k )]
=
[
Ŵ (θ0 |k )−W (θ0 |k )
]
−
[
Ŵ−i (θ0 |k )−W−i (θ0 |k )
]
.
By the same argument as in (29), this leads to[
εδtk · 1− ε · δt(k,tk|k )
]
−
[
εδtk · 1− ε · δt(k,tk|k,−i )
]
= ε ·
(
δt(k,tk|k,−i ) − δt(k,tk|k )
)
≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from t (k, tk |k,−i) ≤ t (k, tk |k ).
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Proof of Lemma 5. (1.) Since
Mi∪j (θ0) = W (θ0)−W−i∪j (θ0)
= W (θ0)−W−j (θ0) +W−j (θ0)−W−i∪j (θ0)
= Mj (θ0) +M
−j
i (θ0) ,
the claim follows if we can show:
M−ji (θ0) ≥Mi (θ0) . (30)
To establish the above inequality, we replace the payoffs of alternative j by the average
payoffs
{
xnj
}∞
n=1
computed along the stopping times
{
τnj
}∞
n=0
, as defined earlier in (20)
and (21):
xj (tj) = x
n
j for τ
n−1
j < t ≤ τnj . (31)
By the property of the tail realizations, established in Lemma 2, and the optimal
index policy, as stated in Lemma 1, we know that the optimal values in the allocation
problem and hence the marginal contribution of alternative i are unaffected if we
modify the payoffs of alternative j′s as done in (31).
Next we split alternative j into n = 1, ...,∞ (sub-)alternatives, denoted by jn,
along the above mentioned stopping times
{
τnj
}∞
n=0
. The payoffs by alternative jn are
defined as follows:
xjn (tjn) =
 xnj if 1 ≤ tjn ≤ τnj − τn−1j ,0 otherwise.
The marginal contribution of alternative i is unaffected by this split of alternative j.
We now prove inequality (30) in the form of Mi (θ0) ≤M−jni (θ0) for all jn. Now,
Mi(θ0)−M−jni (θ0) = W (θ0)−W−i (θ0)−
(
W−jn (θ0)−W−i∪jn (θ0)
)
= W (θ0)−W−jn (θ0)−
(
W−i (θ0)−W−i∪jn (θ0)
)
. (32)
By the Gittins index theorem as stated in Lemma 1, the order of optimal choices
for alternatives different from i and jn is unaffected by the removal of jn. Denote by
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Wjn and W
−i
jn
the continuation value to the social program, with and without i, after
using alternative jn. Let σ
n
j , τnj − τn−1j be the number of periods alternative jn has
a positive contribution of xnj . By elementary calculations, it follows that
W (θ0)−W−jn (θ0) = δt(jn,1)
(
1− δσnj
1− δ x
n
j − (1− δσ
n
j )Wjn
)
, (33)
and
W−i (θ0)−W−i∪jn (θ0) = δt(jn,1|−i )
(
1− δσkj
1− δ x
n
j − (1− δσ
n
j )W−ijn
)
. (34)
After inserting (33) and (34) into (32) and observing that t(jk, 1 |−i) ≤ t(jk, 1), by
Lemma 2, and that W−ijn ≤ Wjn , by virtue of being value functions, the claim is
established.
(2.) It is sufficient to show that if we combine any two alternatives j and j′ into
a single alternative j ∪ j′, then
Mj (θ0)−Mj (θ0 |k ) +Mj′ (θ0)−Mj′ (θ0 |k ) ≤Mj∪j′ (θ0)−Mj∪j′ (θ0 |k ) . (35)
A repeated application of the same inequality would then eventually lead to merge
all alternatives but k under a single identity and lead to the desired result. As
Mj∪j′ (θ0)−Mj′ (θ0) = M−j′j (θ0) (36)
we can write the inequality (35) equivalently as
Mj (θ0)−Mj (θ0 |k ) ≤M−jj (θ0)−M−jj (θ0 |k ) . (37)
The identity in (36) follows directly from the definition of marginal contribution:
Mj∪j′ (θ0)−Mj′ (θ0) =
(
W (θ0)−W−j∪j′ (θ0)
)
−
(
W (θ0)−W−j′ (θ0)
)
= W−j
′
(θ0)−W−j∪j′θ0
= M−j
′
j (θ0) .
Rearranging the inequality (37),
(Mj (θ0)−Mj (θ0 |k ))−
(
M−jj (θ0)−M−jj (θ0 |k )
) ≤ 0, (38)
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we show next that the left hand side is maximized for every k when xk (0) = ... =
xk (τ
1
k). The argument is by contradiction and uses again the construction of (27) and
(28). We thus look at the difference between the payoff generated by the modified
and the original sequence of payoffs, or((
M̂j (θ0)− M̂j (θ0 |k )
)
−
(
M̂−j
′
j (θ0)− M̂−j
′
j (θ0 |k )
))
− ((Mj (θ0)−Mj (θ0 |k ))− (M−jj (θ0)−M−jj (θ0 |k ))) .
The payoffs from the marginal contribution of the efficient program remain un-
changed, and it suffices to evaluate(
M̂−j
′
j (θ0 |k )−M−j
′
j (θ0 |k )
)
−
(
M̂j (θ0 |k )−Mj (θ0 |k )
)
,
or identically expressing it in terms of the social values:((
Ŵ−j
′
(θ0 |k )−W−j′ (θ0 |k )
)
−
(
Ŵ−j∪j
′
(θ0 |k )−W−j∪j′ (θ0 |k )
))
(39)
−
((
Ŵ (θ0 |k )−W (θ0 |k )
)
−
(
Ŵ−j (θ0 |k )−W−j (θ0 |k )
))
.
With the construction of (27) and (28), the payoffs resulting from each term inside
the respective parenthesis are identical with the exception of the first and the tk−th
realization of alternative k. As the timing of the realizations remains unchanged, it
follows that the difference (39) can be written as((
εδtk − εδt(k,tk|k,−j′ )
)
−
(
εδtk − εδt(k,tk|k,−j∪j′ )
))
−
((
εδtk − εδt(k,tk|k )
)
−
(
εδtk − εδt(k,tk|k,−j )
))
,
and after the obvious cancellations:
ε
((
δt(k,tk|k,−j∪j
′ ) − δt(k,tk|k,−j′ )
)
−
(
δt(k,tk|k,−j ) − δt(k,tk|k )
))
.
By Lemma 1, we know that
t (k, tk |k,−j ∪ j′ )− t (k, tk |k,−j′ ) = t (k, tk |k,−j )− t (k, tk |k ) ,
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as well as
t (k, tk |k,−j′ ) ≤ t (k, tk |k ) .
It then follows from discounting with δ ∈ (0, 1), that(
δt(k,tk|k,−j∪j
′ ) − δt(k,tk|k,−j′ )
)
≥
(
δt(k,tk|k,−j ) − δt(k,tk|k )
)
,
which leads to the desired contradiction. Hence it is sufficient to evaluate the in-
equality (38) for constant payoff streams of alternative k. We can write the difference
Mj (θ0)−Mj (θ0 |k ) by Lemma 3 as
Mj (θ0)−Mj (θ0 |k ) = Mkj (θ0) .
It follows that we can rewrite the inequality (38) as
Mkj (θ0) ≤M−j
′,k
j (θ0) ,
which is holds by the first part of this lemma.
Proof of Theorem 2. (1.) By hypothesis, t (k, 1) < t (i, 1). We can therefore write
the marginal contributions of i, Mi (θ0) and Mi (θ0 |k ), respectively as
Mi (θ0) = δ
t(i,1)Mi
(
θt(i,1)
)
and
Mi (θ0 |k ) = δt(i,1|k )Mi
(
θt(i,1|k )
)
By Lemma 1, it further follows that t (i, 1) = t (i, 1 |k ) and that θt(i,1) = θt(i,1|k ) which
establishes the claim.
(2.) By Lemma 4.2, it follows that it is sufficient to evaluate the inequality Mi (θ0) ≥
Mi (θ0 |k ) when the payoff stream of alternative k is constant for all tk with 0 ≤ tk ≤
τ 1k. By Lemma 3.2, the difference then satisfies the relation
1
1− δ (Mi (θ0)−Mi (θ0 |k )) = M
k
i (θ0) ,
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and as the marginal contribution of any alternative to any program is weakly positive,
the weak inequality follows.
(3.) By Lemma 5, it follows that it is sufficient to evaluate the inequality in Theorem
1.3 for the case that there are only two sellers, namely k, and I/ {k}. In this case,
the inequality can be written after expressing the marginal contributions through the
social values as:
W (θ0)−W (θ0 |k ) ≥
(
W (θ0)−W−I/{k} (θ0)
)− (W (θ0 |k )−W−I/{k} (θ0 |k )) ,
and as all terms cancel in this case, it follows that the inequality is always satisfied
and in the extreme case of two sellers in fact as an equality.
Proof of Theorem 3. The existence of the marginal contribution equilibrium was
proved in the previous section. If ti (θ) ≥ Ti for all i, then the continuation game is
in fact a repeated static game of price competition. Define next
Z (θ) , ΣIi=1min (ti (θ) , Ti) .
It is clear that for all states θ′ such that Z (θ′) = ΣIi=1Ti, the marginal contribution
equilibrium is the unique cautious equilibrium. The induction hypothesis that we use
is that the claim is also true for all states θ such that Z (θ) ≥ Z ′, where Z ′ ≤ ΣIi=1Ti.
The claim is then proved by induction if we can show that the claim is also true for
all states such that Z (θ) = Z ′ − 1.
Consider any state θ such that Z (θ) = Z ′ − 1. Denote the equilibrium choice
of the buyer at that state by a (θ) . If a (θ) = i for some i such that ti (θ) < Ti,
then the new state θ′ is such that Z (θ′) = Z ′ and by the induction hypothesis, the
continuation game Γ (θ′) has a unique cautious Markov perfect equilibrium payoff
vector that coincides with the vector of marginal contributions of the players. Let
Mi (θ, j) denote the marginal contribution and hence by the induction hypotheses the
equilibrium continuation payoff to seller i if a (θ) = j. If a (θ) = i for some i such that
ti (θ) ≥ Ti, then θ and the new state θ′ have the same continuation games, and by
the Markov restriction, i will be chosen in all future periods.
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We claim first that the cautious Markov perfect equilibrium payoff is unique for
each fixed first period choice by the buyer. To see this, it is enough to show that the
first period prices are uniquely pinned down by the continuation payoffs. If a (θ) = i,
then pj (θ) = δVj (θ, i) − δVj (θ, j) for all j 6= i by cautiousness. If ti (θ) < Ti, then
Vj (θ, i) = Mj (θ, i) by the induction hypothesis. If ti (θ) ≥ Ti, then Vj (θ, i) = 0 since
the strategies are Markovian. Similarly, if tj (θ) < Tj, Vj (θ, i) = Mj (θ, i) by the
induction hypothesis and if tj (θ) ≥ Tj, then Vj (θ, j) = δV (θ, i) if ti (θ) < Ti, and
Vj (θ, j) = 0 if ti (θ) ≥ Ti. Hence in all cases, pj (θ) is uniquely determined. Finally,
pi (θ) is determined by the pj (θ) , xi (θ) and the xj (θ) and the buyer’s indifference
condition.
Hence the remaining task is to show that for all θ such that Z (θ) = Z ′ − 1, in all
equilibria, a (θ) = i (θ) , where i (θ) is the socially efficient choice at state θ. We argue
by contradiction. To do this, we suppose that a (θ) = k /∈ i (θ) in some equilibrium of
the game starting at θ. Since the marginal contribution equilibrium also exists, there
must be two separate sets of equilibrium prices at θ. Denote the marginal contribution
equilibrium prices by pi (θ) and the prices in the other equilibrium by p̂i (θ) .We know
by construction that in the marginal contribution equilibrium, the buyer is indifferent
between i (θ) and j−i (θ) . Hence we have for the buyer the equilibrium conditions:
VB (θ) = xi(θ) (θ)− pi(θ) (θ) + δ[W (θ, i (θ))− Σl∈IMl (θ, i (θ))]
= xj−i(θ) (θ)− pj−i(θ) (θ) + δ[W
(
θ, j−i (θ)
)− Σl∈IMl (θ, j−i (θ))],
≥ xk (θ)− pk (θ) + δ[W (θ, k)− Σl∈IMl (θ, k)], for all k 6= i (θ) , j−i (θ) ,
and for the efficient seller:
Vi(θ) (θ) = pi(θ) (θ) + δMi(θ) (θ, i (θ)) ≥ δMi(θ)
(
θ, j−i (θ)
)
,
and for all other sellers:
pk (θ) = δMk (θ, i)− δMk (θ, k) for all k 6= i (θ) .
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In the other equilibrium, let j (k) be the seller that he buyer considers as good as
k. Then the buyer’s indifference condition is:
V̂B (θ) = xk (θ)− p̂k (θ) + δ[W (θ, k)− Σl∈IMl (θ, k)]
= xj(k) (θ)− p̂j(k) (θ) + δ[W (θ, j (k))− Σl∈IMl (θ, j (k))],
and for the winning seller k
p̂k (θ) + δMk (θ, k) ≥ δMk (θ, j (k)) ,
and all other sellers l:
p̂l (θ) = δMl (θ, k)− δMl (θ, l) , for all l 6= k.
We derive the contradiction for the case where
t
(
i (θ) , ti(θ)
)
< t
(
j−i (θ) , tj−i(θ)
)
< t (k, tk) < t
(
j (k) , tj(k)
)
.
The remaining cases, i.e. those with
t
(
i (θ) , ti(θ)
)
< t
(
j−i (θ) , tj−i(θ)
)
< t
(
j (k) , tj(k)
)
< t (j, tj)
and the ones where
k = j−i (θ) or j (k) ∈ {i (θ) , j−i (θ)}
are handled similarly. By Theorem 2.1 and the equilibrium conditions,
p̂j(k) (θ) = pj(k) (θ) .
As a result, we have
VB (θ) ≥ V̂B (θ) . (40)
By Theorem 2.2,
Vi(θ) (θ) > V̂i(θ) (θ) . (41)
But (40) and (41) imply jointly that i (θ) can capture the buyer and increase the profit
by offering pi(θ) (θ)−ε instead of p̂i(θ) (θ), contradicting the equilibrium requirements.
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